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Single-Sex “Marriage”: The Role of the Courts∗ 
Lino A. Graglia∗∗ 
As a Burkean conservative, I entertain a strong presumption 
against change in long-standing basic social arrangements and insti-
tutions. However, I will not directly discuss the merits of the single-
sex “marriage” issue, as I can make no claim to special competence 
in family law. Instead, I will discuss the question whether the refusal 
of legislatures to grant some or all of the legal benefits of marriage to 
persons of the same sex is prohibited by either the federal or state 
constitutions. 
It might be noted at the outset that the question must surely 
strike anyone not schooled in constitutional law as strange. Is it really 
possible that the people of the United States or any state, by adopt-
ing a constitution, precluded themselves from defining marriage as 
the union of a man and a woman and from granting a privileged 
status to such unions? Further, how can it be that distinguishing be-
tween marriage and same-sex unions is forbidden by our constitu-
tions and yet no one ever noticed it until just now? The answer, un-
fortunately, is that in the make-believe world of constitutional law all 
things are possible. 
The central question of constitutional law is the question of the 
proper role of judges in our system of government. This is the only 
question common to the myriad issues of social policy—abortion, 
prayer in the schools, race discrimination, the rights of the criminally 
accused, pornography, and so on—decided by judges in the name of 
constitutional law. Every law constitutes a social policy decision 
made in the ordinary political process; every ruling of unconstitu-
tionality constitutes a rejection of that policy choice and the substitu-
tion of a different policy choice by judges. The American people, 
through the process of representative self-government, express their 
policy preferences by electing legislators who, on the principle of 
separation of powers, are supposedly the sole possessors of lawmak-
 
 ∗ This article was presented at the Symposium on the ALI Principles on the Law of 
Family Dissolution, held at Brigham Young University’s J. Reuben Clark Law School on Feb-
ruary 1, 2001. 
 ∗∗ A. Dalton Cross Professor in Law, University of Texas School of Law, Austin, Texas.  
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ing authority. The policy choices made by elected legislators actually 
prevail in our system, however, only insofar as they are not, in the 
name of constitutional law, rejected by our judges.1 
The willingness and ability of our judges to have the final say on 
issues of basic social policy is well illustrated by the recent decisions 
regarding the meaning and social value of marriage by the Oregon 
Court of Appeals in Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences University 2 
and by the Supreme Court of Vermont in Baker v. State.3 The judg-
ment of Western society—indeed, of most human societies—has al-
ways been that the union of a man and a woman as the nucleus of a 
family, hopefully for life, is essential to the maintenance of a stable, 
or even a viable, society. Such unions have, therefore, been given a 
unique status—established, encouraged, and protected by innumer-
able laws, customs, and practices—making marriage as fundamental 
an institution to our society and culture as any we have. Many of our 
modern-day judges, however, acting solely on the basis of their own 
notions of social progress and the scope of their lawmaking author-
ity, have decided that this is all an unfortunate relic of a less enlight-
ened and less well-intentioned past. 
How does it happen that these judges, who, after all, have gener-
ally been raised and educated in our society, should have such a radi-
cally different view of the meaning and value of marriage? Most im-
portantly, what is the source of their authority to make their view 
determinative such that we are bound to accept and respect it? The 
answer to the first question is that they are merely affirming their ad-
herence to what they consider the more prestigious side in a cultural 
conflict. William F. Buckley famously stated that he would rather be 
governed by the first two thousand names in the Boston phone book 
 
 1. An analogy might be drawn with the situation formerly existing in some South 
American countries where elections would be held but the results permitted to stand only to 
the extent that they proved acceptable to a military junta. See, e.g., Clandestine Group Calls 
for Ouster of Junta, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Nov. 20, 1982, at AM Cycle (Argentina); Bolivians 
Ponder Revolt: Who Won?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1981, at A4 (Bolivia); Edward Schumacher, 
For Bolivia, Chaos Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 1981, at A11 (Bolivia); UNITED PRESS INT’L, 
Sept. 29, 1980, at AM Cycle (El Salvador). 
 2. 971 P.2d 435 (1998) (holding that unmarried homosexual couples qualify as a sus-
pect class for purposes of the privilege and immunities clause of the Oregon Constitution, and 
that a university’s denial of insurance benefits to the domestic partners of its homosexual em-
ployees violated the Oregon Constitution). 
 3. 744 A.2d 864 (1999) (holding that the exclusion of same-sex couples from benefits 
and protections incident to marriage under state law is a violation of the Vermont Constitu-
tion). 
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than by the two thousand members of the Harvard faculty.4 This is 
surely one of his wisest observations. The Harvard faculty, brilliant as 
all the members undoubtedly are, live immersed in a world of words 
that enable them to imagine situations and reach conclusions so re-
moved from our social norms that to ordinary persons they would be 
literally unthinkable. Brilliance, unfortunately, is not the only, or 
perhaps even the most essential, element of good judgment. On the 
contrary, it often leads to an overestimation of one’s wisdom and 
goodness and ability to rethink and remake the world. 
The most serious defect of the form of government we have 
permitted to evolve from the form of government created by our 
state and federal constitutions is that in effect we are now being 
ruled by the Harvard faculty, albeit only through judges, persons 
once removed from and not necessarily all quite as brilliant as that 
faculty. Our judges, all educated (or at least processed) through col-
lege and law school, are the products of Harvard (and, perhaps even 
worse, Yale), its equivalents, and its many lesser imitators. 
The salient fact of our society at the present day, as many others 
have noted,5 is that we are engaged in a culture war. It is a war be-
tween our cultural elite, the intelligentsia, and aspiring intelligentsia 
(what has been called the “chattering class”)—the dominant force in 
our universities and media of communication—on the one hand, and 
the ordinary American citizen on the other.6 The average citizen 
holds views on a wide range of issues of basic social policy—for ex-
ample, on capital punishment, prayer in the schools, the permissibil-
ity of religious symbols in public places, enforcement of the criminal 
law, assignment of children to neighborhood schools, the suppres-
sion of pornography, flag burning, and specifically relating to the 
 
 4. See William F. Buckley, Jr., Au Pair Case No Reason to Condemn Courts, 
HOUSTON CHRON., Nov. 8, 1997, at 36, quoted in Lino A. Graglia, Panel IV: Roundtable 
Discussion: The Revitalization of Democracy—Revitalizing Democracy, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 165, 171 (2000). 
 5. For example, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Romer v. Evans, stated: 
The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite. The constitutional amend-
ment before us here is not the manifestation of a “‘bare . . . desire to harm’” homo-
sexuals,  . . . but is rather a modest attempt by seemingly tolerant Coloradans to pre-
serve traditional sexual mores against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to 
revise those mores through use of the laws. 
517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (citing the majority opin-
ion). 
 6. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH: MODERN 
LIBERALISM AND AMERICAN DECLINE (1996). 
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point of the conference for which this article was prepared, homo-
sexuality and marriage—that are anathema to our cultural elite. The 
difficulty with our system of representative self-government, as the 
intelligentsia sees it, is that everyone gets to vote, with the result that 
the views of the unenlightened masses are likely to prevail.7 
The function of constitutional law, in the view of our cultural 
elite and as it has largely operated in recent decades, is to keep this 
from happening. The first and most important thing to understand 
about constitutional law is that it has very little to do with a constitu-
tion. It has become essentially a device or ruse for policymaking by 
judges. Such policymaking is much preferred by our cultural elite to 
policymaking by the elected representatives of the people because 
judges, given a free hand in policymaking, can generally be relied on 
to serve as the mirror, mouthpiece, and enacting arm of liberal aca-
demia in general and liberal legal academia in particular. Law profes-
sors, overwhelmingly well to the left of the American public, are to 
judges as the New York Times drama critic is to a playwright. 
The second (and final) understanding necessary to a full under-
standing of constitutional law is that rulings of unconstitutionality 
over the past four decades have not been random in their political 
impact; on the contrary, they have overwhelmingly served to further 
the policy preferences of those on the extreme left of the American 
political spectrum. If one wishes to so radically change the meaning 
of marriage, for example, as to no longer require the presence of a 
man and a woman, one has virtually no chance of succeeding by ap-
pealing to an American legislature. The prospect of success is enor-
mously enhanced, however, if the issue can somehow be removed 
from the control of legislators and decided instead by judges using 
the magic and mystery of constitutional law. This is the only reason 
constitutional law has become so pervasive and important and is so 
enthusiastically supported and defended in legal academia. 
 
 7. For example, Justice William Brennan stated the following in a speech he gave at 
Georgetown University on October 12, 1985: 
The view that all matters of substantive policy should be resolved through the 
majoritarian process has appeal under some circumstances, but I think it ultimately 
will not do. Unabashed enshrinement of majoritarianism would permit the 
imposition of a social caste system or wholesale confiscation of property so long as 
approved by a majority of the fairly elected, authorized legislative body . . . . 
Faith in democracy is one thing, blind faith quite another . . . . 
William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification, 27 
S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 436–37 (1986). 
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This magic and mystery is nicely illustrated in the Tanner and 
Baker decisions, each holding that some or all of the benefits be-
stowed by law on marriage must also be bestowed on certain ar-
rangements between same-sex couples.8 In each case the judges 
wrote opinions, as is required by convention, purporting to explain 
the basis of their decisions. As in almost every case involving a ruling 
of unconstitutionality, however, the judges faced the impossible task 
of showing that their rulings constituted an exercise of the judicial 
rather than the legislative function, that they resulted from the appli-
cation of law—pre-existing, authoritative rules—rather than from 
nothing more than the judges’ own personal policy preferences. 
What legal, as opposed to purely personal, justification could the 
Tanner and Baker judges possibly offer for their decisions? Where is 
it written, do you suppose, in the Oregon and Vermont constitu-
tions that their legislatures may not prefer marriage to same-sex liai-
sons? In each case, the judges purported to interpret and apply a 
provision of their state constitution that is taken to replicate or paral-
lel and usually to extend the Equal Protection Clause of the United 
States Constitution.9 The Oregon court relied on Article I, section 
20 of the Oregon Constitution,10 which provides: “No law shall be 
passed granting to any citizen or class of citizens privileges, or im-
munities, which, upon the same terms, shall not equally belong to all 
citizens.”11 The Vermont court relied on Chapter 1, Article 7 of the 
Vermont Constitution,12 which provides that “government is, or 
ought to be, instituted for the common benefit, protection, and se-
curity of the people, nation, or community, and not for the particu-
lar emolument or advantage of any single person, family, or set of 
persons, who are a part only of that community.”13 
In each case, the judges read these provisions as if they imposed a 
general requirement of equality, even though no such requirement is 
possible. The law does not and cannot treat all persons—young and 
old, weak and strong, rich and poor, male and female, and so on—as 
 
 8. See Tanner v. Or. Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); Baker 
v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999). 
 9. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: “No State shall . . . deny to any person . . . 
the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 10. Tanner, 971 P.2d at 445. 
 11. OR. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
 12. Baker, 744 A.2d at 869–70. 
 13. VT. CONST. ch. 1, art. 7. 
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equal in all regards. The very purpose of law is to classify (discrimi-
nate among) people for different treatment; for example, burglary 
statutes distinguish burglars from nonburglars. Blacks, women, and 
eighteen-year-olds have the right to vote, while aliens and felons do 
not, not because of any principle or requirement of equality (or 
“equal protection”), but because they were given the right by the 
Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-Sixth Amendments, respectively. 
There is no requirement of equality other than the tautology that 
all people must be treated in accordance with their legal rights.14 
When judges decide that some homosexual unions have the same le-
gal status as marriage, they are not, as they invariably claim, enforc-
ing a legal or constitutional requirement of equality—there is none. 
What they are doing instead is legislating for homosexuals rights 
other than those granted by the legislature. 
Decisions extending marital rights to homosexual unions do so 
on no other basis or authority than the fact that full societal accep-
tance, if not endorsement, of homosexuality is the current cause cé-
lèbre in today’s academia. The primary function of judicial opinions 
explaining these decisions is to deny or conceal this fact and to per-
petuate the fraudulent claim that they are the commands of pre-
existing law. Thus, the Vermont Supreme Court began its opinion 
by insisting that it was merely performing its “constitutional respon-
sibility to consider the legal merits” of the plaintiffs’ claim.15 Its deci-
sion, it told us, is “grounded and objective, and not based upon the 
private sensitivities or values of individual judges.”16 The court’s only 
reason for making this claim, of course, is that it is so obviously un-
true. The business of courts, it assured us, quoting Justice Souter, is 
“constitutional review, not judicial law making.”17 This insistence 
was to be expected from Justice Souter, because he is probably the 
judge on the present Supreme Court who is most willing and ready 
to engage in law making, just as repeating it was to be expected from 
the notoriously activist Vermont Supreme Court. It is no surprise 
that a court willing to remake the public school system of Vermont 
 
 14. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REV. 537 
(1982). 
 15. 744 A.2d at 867. 
 16. Id. at 879. 
 17. Id. (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 768 (1997) (Souter, J., 
concurring)). 
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to bring it into accord with current academic views on the subject18 
would also be willing to remake the law of marriage to achieve the 
same end. 
There is no surer sign of a court’s determination to evade or defy 
the text of a law, constitution, or other document than the court’s 
assertion of reliance on the document’s “spirit” rather than its literal 
terms. This is what the Vermont Supreme Court relied on, for ex-
ample, when it held that “spouse” in a Vermont law included a 
same-sex homosexual partner.19 In Baker, the court spoke of the 
need “to discover . . . the core value” and “distill the essence” of Ar-
ticle 7.20 The core value and essence that it then discovered and dis-
tilled, amazingly but predictably, converted Article 7 into a prohibi-
tion of the legislature’s continuing to define marriage as the union of 
a man and a woman. 
Judicial talk of “spirit,” “core values,” and “essences” is simply 
conventional rigmarole meant to obfuscate the fact that the court is 
effectively writing into law a policy decision the legislature did not 
make and would not make. The Baker decision is supported not by 
any spirit or essence of Vermont law, but by nothing more than the 
judges’ personal view, in accord with current elite opinion, that the 
reasons for preferring marriage to homosexual partnerships in grant-
ing legal benefits are vestiges of a darker time. It is very difficult to 
see, however, why the people of Vermont should agree that on so 
basic an issue of social policy it is the view of the judges, a committee 
of five lawyers, rather than the views of the people’s elected 
representatives, that should prevail. 
The reasoning by which the Oregon Court of Appeals disallowed 
a law that effectively granted to married couples and their families 
certain advantages not granted to persons in other communal ar-
rangements, including homosexual partnerships, is equally unimpres-
sive. With perfect circularity, the court held, in effect, that the legis-
lature’s favoring of marriage over homosexual unions is unconsti-
tutional because the legislature favors and has always favored mar-
riage.21 By granting certain benefits only to married couples and de-
fining marriage as a union of a man and a woman, the Oregon legis-
 
 18. See Brigham v. Vermont, 692 A.2d 384 (Vt. 1997). 
 19. See In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1274 (Vt. 1993). 
 20. 744 A.2d at 874 (citation omitted). 
 21. See Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., 971 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1998). 
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lature made homosexuals, the court found, an historically disadvan-
taged group.22 But historic disadvantage, according to the court, is a 
defining characteristic of a “suspect” classification which must be 
given strict (“particularly exacting”) scrutiny by judges.23 Strict scru-
tiny means that the law will be presumed unconstitutional and up-
held only if the legislature offers justifications the judges consider 
sufficient, a nearly impossible task, especially when the challenged 
distinction is based on moral, traditional, or broad social grounds, 
rather than on empirically demonstrable utilitarian considerations. 
More simply, strict scrutiny means that the judges have decided to 
make themselves the final policymakers on the issue involved. 
By adopting their state constitutions, the people of the states 
precluded themselves, they have learned to their astonishment many 
years later, from continuing to grant to the marital relationship the 
central privileged status it had always had as the basis of our civiliza-
tion. This is so, however, not because of anything the people have 
done or meant to do, but only because a few lawyers in robes, shar-
ing and willing to impose the views of a cultural elite, have abused 
the power of their office in order to declare it so. What, then, can the 
people do? Are they really in thrall to the views of five up-to-date, 
politically correct lawyers willing to legislate in the guise of interpret-
ing the state constitution? The people of Vermont and Oregon can, 
of course, attempt to obtain the supermajority necessary to amend 
their state constitutions to overturn the work of their advanced-
thinking judges, as was done in Hawaii, but this means that the 
judges’ view on any social policy issue prevails as long as the small 
minority needed to defeat a constitutional amendment supports that 
view. 
It should be noted that the legal situation in Hawaii was some-
what different from that in Vermont and Oregon. In Baehr v. 
Lewin,24 the Supreme Court of Hawaii held that the claim that de-
nial of a marriage license to a same-sex couple violated the Hawaii 
Constitution stated a cause of action. The Hawaii Constitution ex-
plicitly prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex in regard to “civil 
rights.” The Baehr court held, correctly in my view, that denial of 
marital rights to same-sex couples is sex discrimination (John may 
 
 22. See id. at 443. 
 23. Id. at 446. 
 24. 852 P.2d 44 (1993). 
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marry Mary because he is a man, Joan may not because she is a 
woman) and, at least arguably correctly, that the right to marry is a 
civil right. 
As a participant some years ago in the debates on the proposed 
Equal Rights Amendment to the United States Constitution, I ar-
gued that a constitutional prohibition of sex discrimination would 
inevitably lead to the argument that denial of the right to marry to 
same-sex couples is unconstitutional and that the argument could be 
expected often to succeed. The argument was dismissed as ludicrous 
by proponents of the Equal Rights Amendment, but this is what 
happened in Hawaii. Laws, people must learn, particularly laws 
stated in sweeping terms, are dangerous things. 
The only effective solution to the problem illustrated by the 
Baker and Tanner decisions is amendment of the state constitutions, 
not merely to overturn these particular unwanted policy decisions, 
but to remove definitively from judges the policymaking power they 
have assigned themselves in the guise of interpreting the state consti-
tution. State constitutions, like the Federal Constitution, do not ex-
plicitly provide for judicial review, the extraordinary and unprece-
dented power of judges to substitute their policy views for those of 
elected legislators. Judges acquired the power only by finding it to 
be “implied” in written constitutions.25 State constitutions should be 
amended to make clear that judges have no such power and that the 
people of the states are sufficiently confident in their power of self-
government to be willing to risk it without the supervision and guid-
ance of their judges. There is no single step the people of any state 
could take that would contribute more to the restoration of repre-
sentative self-government and the political health of both their state 
and the country. 
 
 25. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) (“This theory is 
essentially attached to a written constitution . . . .”). 
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